The logic behind Primakov's coup

His tactics have been superb. He has survived every twist and turn of his country's recent political history, serving every leader since Khrushchev, variously as spy, scholar, bureaucrat, and prime minister. Even his enemies could hardly fault Yevgeny Primakov's footwork as an insider-cum-infighter.

During his stint as premier he seemed content to be managing Russia's decline, rather than coming up with a means to reverse it. Perhaps, his job, keeping Russia's misery quietly contained, was task enough for him. But then moderation has always been his forte.

So the question is why would Primakov all of a sudden take the risk now and throw in his lot with Luzhkov and his Fatherland-All Russia movement?

Here is the first-and the most improbable-explanation. All Primakov wants is a strong showing in the parliamentary balloting and-maybe-the post of the Duma speaker. Then he could serve as a springboard for Luzhkov in the presidential contest next spring-by pushing for nomination of a Luzhkovian prot╘g╘ as prime minister, or even becoming premier himself.

For this to happen, of course, the Fatherland-All Russia bloc will have to get a majority in parliament-still better, absolute majority-an unlikely event.

Why would Primakov do it? Simply because he wants to see Russia rescued out of her misery-and believes that Luzhkov is the right man for the job.

This could be true, but the problem is nothing like that has ever happened in politics, least of all in Russian politics.

The second explanation is that just as Luzhkov wants to use Primakov, Primakov means to use Luzhkov as a beachhead for his assault on the presidency.

The two men's immediate goal is to capture seats in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, in the Dec. 19 election. But both are also leading candidates for president in next summer's vote. Primakov acknowledged that they have not yet decided which one will be the presidential contender from the new bloc.

"We will come to terms," Primakov told a crowded news conference in August. Primakov remains among the most popular of all Russian political figures, and Luzhkov is extremely popular in Moscow. In recent nationwide surveys by the Fund for Public Opinion, Primakov was chosen by 19 percent of respondents who were asked whom they would choose as president if the election were held today. Luzhkov was third in the poll with 9 percent, following Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, who was chosen by 15 percent of those answering the survey.

Finally, there is a fourth and by far the most interesting-and credible-explanation. Primakov knows for sure that Yeltsin has already decided to move up the presidential poll to December, to coincide with the parliamentary elections. If this is true, he has every reason to make haste.

Moving up the presidential poll would indeed be a "strong move" (in Anatoly Chubais's terminology). For one thing, this would derail Luzhkov. Luzhkov is also on the December ballot for reelection as Moscow mayor and would find it impossible, without losing too much face, to drop out of the race-and cannot run in both of them at one and the same time.

This would leave his Fatherland movement without a leader-and a presidential candidate-unless, that is, Primakov agrees to step into Luzhkov's shoes.

Can it happen? Yeltsin could easily find an excuse to move up the election-quoting ill health being the most obvious of all. Neither Luzhkov, nor the Communists or Grigory Yavlinsky can object. They it was who have been clamoring for Yeltsin's resignation and early presidential election. No one else but Luzhkov and Zyuganov have kept saying that Yeltsin is physical wreck and unfit to govern.

The Fatherland-All Russia's platform, outlining "One Hundred Laws for Russia," calls, among other things, for an independent committee of doctors to be set up to decide when the president is unfit to go on serving. "A sick person is not always the best judge of his own health," the manifesto gingerly says.

But bashing your opponents is one thing. Finding something positive for people to vote for, however, is another. This is where the Kremlin camp is weakest. Enter Vladimir Putin, Russia's latest prime minister.

Yeltsin, still proclaiming himself a democrat at heart, insists that he is prepared to lose power at the ballot box. His cronies, who have plenty to fear if this happens (not least a scrutiny of their finances), are less keen.

So they are looking to Putin, whom Yeltsin named in August as his preferred successor, to rescue them from defeat, by fair means certainly, possibly by foul ones too.

Like Primakov, another spymaster who headed the Russian government, Putin's background in the KGB and Federal Security Service gives him the aura of being well-informed, well-connected and mysterious. That counts for a lot, especially in Russia, where seven decades of totalitarian rule have left people with an unhealthy respect for secret services.

But if Putin, whose chief known habit is obedience to president, is to have a realistic shot at the presidency, some things will have to happen first. One, he will have to bring to heel the separatists in Dagestan.

Although the crackdown was begun under Stepashin, it could be that Putin finishes off the job-and gets the credit. Dealing firmly with "Muslim extremists" is, after all, a guaranteed vote-winner in Russia-if it is done successfully, which it was not in Chechnya.

Putin's other immediate task will be to sharpen the attack on Luzhkov's Moscow base. In July, while Putin was still at the federal secret police, it raided banks holding accounts of firms owned by Luzhkov's wife, which have enjoyed lucrative municipal contracts. Tax inspectors have begun to investigate the city's finances.

The new prime minister's third job would be to weaken Luzhkov's regional support. During a previous stint at the Kremlin, Putin handled relations with the heads of Russia's 89 constituent parts. He knows their wants and their weaknesses, and has both carrots (federal patronage) and sticks (compromising material) to hand.

Luzhkov's larder and armory, by comparison, are less well stocked. The city of Moscow is rich by Russian standards, but nothing like as rich as the presidential administration and federal government combined.

And with elections looming (both in Russia and America), skeletons may come tumbling out of cupboards at a faster pace than anyone in the Kremlin or the State Duma-or, as the scandal around the Bank of New York illustrated, in the White House-can control.

So the word is Yeltsin may soon retire to a holiday home, or a clinic-to give Putin a better chance to show his worth-and sink or swim.

If he chooses to do the latter and starts growing in stature and plausibility, then the chances are Yeltsin will call an early presidential election in December.

It may be his last and only chance to have his man installed in the Kremlin for the next five years. And then only Primakov will be standing in the way.